⭐⭐⭐⭐⭐ Early Attachment Theory Essay
Is this what Early Attachment Theory Essay sensitive feels like? There is something quite fundamental Early Attachment Theory Essay care proceedings which is that something needed to change for this child to be safe at Early Attachment Theory Essay with their family of origin. But as Early Attachment Theory Essay fundamental bedrock of good parenting, it seems very obvious to Severe Disabilities Teaching Strategies that it is what is Early Attachment Theory Essay. Donald A. When the how did the industrial revolution start is Early Attachment Theory Essay laid out to them and they are told exactly Early Attachment Theory Essay they have to Early Attachment Theory Essay to alleviate concerns for Early Attachment Theory Essay children,I feel most will react.
Attachment Theory - How Your Childhood Affects Your Love Style
But Kant and other retributivist defenders of the death penalty rightly distinguish principled retribution from vengeance. Vengeance is typically personal, directed at someone about whom the avenger cares—it is personal. Retribution requires responses even to injuries of people no one cares about: its impersonality makes harms to the friendless as weighty as harms to the popular and justifies punishment without regard to whether anyone desires the offender suffer.
Even if desires for vengeance are satisfied by executing murderers, for retributivists such effects are not at the heart of the defense of capital punishment. And to the extent that such satisfactions are sufficient justification, then the defense is no longer retributivist, but utilitarian or consequentialist see sections 3 and 4. For retributivists the morality of the death penalty for murder is a matter of general moral principle, not assuaging any desires for revenge or vengeance on the part of victims or others. One approach employs the idea of basic moral rights, such as the right to life, an expression of the value of life that seems to work against justifying capital punishment.
Yet John Locke, for example, in his Second Treatise on Government , posits both a natural right to life and defends the death penalty for murderers. For Locke, murderers have, by their voluntary wrongdoing, forfeited their own right to life and can therefore be treated as a being not possessing any right to life at all and as subject to execution to effect some good for society.
This form of retributivism—rights forfeiture and considering consequences of the death penalty—is also explicitly expressed by W. Ross in his book, The Right and the Good :. But to hold that the state has no duty of retributive punishment is not necessarily to adopt a utilitarian view of punishment. It is morally at liberty to injure him as he has injured others, or to inflict any lesser injury on him, or to spare him, exactly as consideration of both of the good of the community and of his own good requires. This kind of retributivist approach to capital punishment raises philosophic issues, aside from its reliance on empirical claims about the effects of the death penalty as a way to deter or incapacitate offenders see section 3b.
Can this right, once forfeited, ever be restored? Second, given that the right to life is so fundamental to all rights and, as many maintain, held equally by each and all because they are humans, perhaps the right to life is exceptional or even unique in not being forfeitable at all: the right to life is actually a fundamental natural or human right. Even killers retain their right to life, the state remains bound by the correlative duty not to kill a murderer, and capital punishment, then, is a violation of the human right to life. Developed in this way, as a matter of fundamental human rights, the merit of capital punishment becomes more about the moral standing of human beings and less about the logic and mobility of rights through forfeiture or alienation.
The notion… [is] perhaps the most misused term in our moral vocabulary. A recently revived retributivism about the death penalty builds not on individual rights, but on a notion of fairness in society. Given a society with reasonably just rules of cooperation that bestow benefits and burdens on its members, misconduct takes unfair advantage of others, and punishment is thereby merited to address the advantage gained:. A person who violates the rules has something that others have—the benefits of the system—but by renouncing what others have assumed, the burdens of self-restraint, he has acquired an unfair advantage. Matters are not even until this advantage is in some way erased….
Morris His crime consists only in the unfair advantage… [taken] by breaking the law in question. The greater the advantage, the greater the punishment should be. The focus of the unfair advantage principle is on what the criminal gained. In justifying an amount of punishment, then, an unfairness principle focuses on the advantage gained, whereas the lex talionis principle attends to the harm done to another Davis In such cases one can perhaps see unfair advantage gained and see the amount of punishment as tied to what is unfairly gained.
But for violent crimes such as murder, the fairness approach seems less plausible. How does lengthy incarceration or even execution erase the unfair advantage gained, annul the crime, or re-establish any prior balance between perpetrator and victim? To the extent that punishment affects such things, it risks conflating retribution with restitution or restoration. The unfair advantage principle also characterizes the wrong committed not in terms of its effects on a victim, but on third parties—society members who exercise self-restraint by obeying those norms the offender violates.
Additionally, taken by itself, the unfair advantage approach to establishing the proper amount of punishment can also have some odd consequences, as Jeffrey Reiman rather colorfully suggests:. For example, it would seem that the value of the unfair advantage taken of law-obeyers by one who robs a great deal of money is greater than the value of the unfair advantage taken by a murderer, since the latter gets only the advantage of ridding his world of a nuisance while the former will be able to make a new life… and have money left over for other things. This leads to the counterintuitive conclusion that such robbers should be punished more severely… than murderers. The death penalty for murder, then, would not obviously be morally justified if the general criterion for the amount of punishment is an unfair advantage principle.
A defense of the death penalty for murder has been proposed by employing another version of this general approach to punishment. The key is seeing the kind of unfair advantage gained by a murderer. Retributivist approaches to capital punishment are many and varied. But from even the small sample above, notable similarities are often cited as challenges for this way of thinking about the moral justification of punishment by death. First, retributivism with respect to capital punishment either invokes principles that are plausible, if at all, only for death as penalty for murder; or it relies on principles met only with reasoned skepticism about their general adequacy for constructing a plausible scale matching various crimes with proper penal responses.
Second, retributivists presuppose that persons are responsible for any criminal misconduct for which they are to be punished, but actually instituting capital punishment confronts the reality of some social conditions, for example, that challenge the presupposition of voluntariness and, in the case of the fairness approach, that challenge the presupposition of a reasonably just system of social cooperation see section 5b.
Third, it is often argued that, in addressing the moral merits of capital punishment, retributivists ignore or make markedly secondary the causal consequences of the practice. What if no benefits accrue to anyone from the practice of capital punishment? What if capital punishment significantly increases the rate of murders or violent crimes? What if the institution of capital punishment sometimes, often, or inevitably is arbitrary, capricious, discriminatory, or even mistaken in its selecting those to be punished by death see section 5? These and other possible consequences of capital punishment seem relevant, even probative. The challenge is that retributivists ignore or diminish their importance, perhaps defending or opposing the death penalty despite such effects and not because of them.
A utilitarian approach to justifying capital punishment appeals only to the consequences or effects of death being the penalty for serious crimes, such as murder. More specifically, a utilitarian approach sees punishment by death as justified only if that amount of punishment for murder best promotes the total happiness, pleasure, or well-being of the society. The idea is that the inherent pain and any negative effects of capital punishment must be exceeded by its beneficial effects, such as crime prevention through incapacitation and deterrence; and furthermore, the total effects of the death penalty—good and bad, for offender and everyone else—must be greater than the total effects of alternative penal responses to serious misconduct, such as long-term incarceration.
A utilitarian approach to capital punishment is inherently comparative in this way: it is essentially tied to the consequences of the practice being best for the total happiness of the society. It follows, then, that a utilitarian approach relies on what are, in principle, empirical, causal claims about the total marginal effects of capital punishment on offenders and others. A classic utilitarian approach to punishment is that of Jeremy Bentham. The general object which all law have, or ought to have in common, is to augment the total happiness of the community. Upon the principle of utility, if it ought at all to be admitted, it ought only to be admitted in as far as it promises to exclude some greater evil.
I, ii. The immediate principal end of punishment is to control action. Beccaria called for abolition of the death penalty largely by appealing to its comparative inefficacy in reducing the crime rate. In Chapter XII of his essay, Beccaria says the general aim of punishment is deterrence and that should govern the amount of punishment to be assigned crimes:. The purpose of punishment… is nothing other than to dissuade the criminal from doing fresh harm to his compatriots and to keep other people from doing the same.
Therefore, the intensity of a sentence of servitude for life, substituted for the death penalty, has everything needed to deter the most determined spirit. The idea here is that an execution is a single, severe event, perhaps not long remembered by others, whereas life imprisonment provides a continuing reminder of the punishment for misconduct. Beccaria adds to this thinking at least two claims about some bad social effects of capital punishment: first, for many the death penalty becomes a spectacle, and for some it evokes pity for the offender rather than the fear of execution needed for effective deterrence of criminal misconduct 49; Ch.
Another major utilitarian, John Stuart Mill, also exemplifies distinctive facets of a utilitarian approach, but in defense of capital punishment. Since the deterrent effect of a punishment depends far more on what it seems than what it is, capital punishment is the better deterrent of others while also involving less pain and suffering for the offender. A utilitarian approach to capital punishment depends essentially on what are, in fact, the causal effects of the practice, whether the death penalty is, in fact, effective in incapacitating or deterring potential offenders. If, in fact, it does not effect these ends better than penal alternatives such as lengthy incarceration, then capital punishment is not justified on utilitarian grounds.
In principle, at least, the comparative efficacy of capital punishment is therefore an empirical issue. A number of social scientific studies have been conducted in search of conclusions about the effects of capital punishment, at least in America. With respect to the end of incapacitation, any crime prevention benefit of executing murderers depends on recidivism rates, that is, the likelihood that murderers again kill. Recent studies of convicted murderers—death row inmates not executed, prison homicides, parolees, and released murderers—indicate that the recidivism rate is quite low, but not zero: a small percentage of murderers kill again, either in prison or upon release Bedau, The Death Penalty , These crimes, of course, would not have occurred were capital punishment imposed, and, so, the death penalty does prevent commission of some serious crimes.
On the other hand, for a utilitarian, these benefits of incapacitation through execution must exceed those for possible punitive alternatives. The data reflects recidivism rates under current practices, not other possible alternatives. If, for example, pardons and commutations were eliminated for capital crimes, if atrocious crimes were punished by a life sentence without any possibility of parole, or if conditions of confinement were such that prison murders were not possible for example, shackled, solitary confinement for life , then the recidivism rate might approach or be zero.
One issue, then, is how high or low a recidivism rate decides the justificatory issue for capital punishment. Another issue is the moral permissibility of establishing conditions of confinement so restrictive that even murders in prison are reduced to nearly zero. Since the mid-twentieth century, in America a number of empirical studies have been conducted in order to assess the deterrent effects of capital punishment in comparison to those of life imprisonment.
Scholars analyzed decades of data to compare jurisdictions with and without the death penalty, as well as the effects before and after a jurisdiction abolished or instituted capital punishment. Sophisticated statistical studies published in the mids claimed to show that each execution deterred seven to eight murders. This exceptional study and its methodology have been much criticized Bailey, Determining the deterrent effects of capital punishment does present significant epistemic challenges.
Pojman, Numerous variables may or may not explain the data attempting to link crime rates and the death penalty in different places or times Pojman, Second, as Beccaria notes, for example, deterrent effects plausibly depend importantly on the certainty, speed, and public nature of penal responses to criminal conduct. These factors have not been much evident in recent capital punishment practices in America, which may explain the lack of evidence revealed by recent statistical studies.
Third, deterrence is a causal concept: the idea is that potential murderers do not kill because of the death penalty. So, the challenges are to measure what does not occur—murders — and to establish what causes the omission—the death penalty. The latter element is even more challenging to measure because most who do not murder do so out of habit, character, religious beliefs, lack of opportunity, etc. Deterrence studies, then, attempt to establish empirically a causal relationship for a small minority of people and omitted homicides within a death penalty jurisdiction. For example, abolitionists typically see that, despite numerous attempts, the failure to provide conclusive evidence strongly suggests there is no such effect: the death penalty, in fact, does not deter.
Defenders of capital punishment are inclined to interpret the empirical studies as being inconclusive: it remains an open question whether the death penalty deters sufficiently to justify it. And all this is further complicated by the fact that some studies focus on the effects of capital statutes and others look for links between actual executions and crime rates. Regardless of the outcomes or probative value of statistical studies, justifying capital punishment on grounds of deterrence may still have merit.
The deterrence justification of capital punishment presupposes a model of calculating, deliberative rationality for potential murderers. What people cherish most is life; what they most fear is being killed. So, given a choice between life in prison and execution by the state, most people much prefer life and therefore will refrain from misconduct for which death is the punishment.
Another way of looking at capital punishment in terms of deterrence relies on making the best decision under conditions of uncertainty. If capital punishment is not, in fact, a superior deterrent, then some murderers have been unnecessarily executed by the state; if, on the other hand, death is not a possible punishment for murder and capital punishment is, in fact, a superior deterrent, then some preventable killings of innocent persons would occur. Given the greater value of innocent lives, the less risky, better option justifies capital punishment on grounds of deterrence.
But the argument crucially depends on comparative risk assessments: if there is capital punishment, then certainly some murderers will be killed, whereas without the death penalty there is only a remote chance that more innocent lives would be victims of murder Conway, Furthermore, the argument openly assumes that not all lives are equal—those of the innocent are not to be risked as much as those who have murdered—and that, for some, is a fundamental moral issue at stake in justifying capital punishment see section 2c; Pojman, Utilitarian approaches to justifying punishment are controversial and problematic, perhaps most often with respect to possibly justifying punishment of the innocent as a means to preventing crime and promoting total happiness of a society.
Even ignoring this issue and focusing only on justifying the proper amount of punishment for the guilty and the death penalty, in particular, there are concerns to be considered about a utilitarian approach. The objection is that a utilitarian approach to the death penalty relies on a suspect general criterion—deterrence—for establishing the proper amount of punishment for crimes. It is often argued that, for purposes of crime prevention through deterrence, a utilitarian is committed, at least in principle, to excessively severe punishments, such as torturous and gruesome executions in public even for crimes much less serious than murder for example, Ten, , The idea is that the pain of excessively severe and public punishments for minor crimes is more than counterbalanced by a significant reduction in a crime rate.
It is also argued that significant crime rate reductions could perhaps be achieved, in some circumstances, by disproportionately minor punishments: if fines, light prison sentences, or even fake executions could deter as well as actual ones, then a utilitarian is committed to disproportionately mild penalties for grave crimes. Utilitarians respond to such possibilities by indicating additional considerations relevant to calculating the total costs of such disproportionate punishments, while critics continue creating even more elaborate, fantastic counterexamples designed to show the utilitarian approach cannot always avoid questions about the upper or lower limits of morally permissible penal responses to misconduct. Another common criticism of the utilitarian approach points to the very structure of justifications rooted in deterrence.
Capital punishment, then, aims to deter actions of potential killers by inflicting death on actual ones: the technique works by threat, by instilling fear in others. No gain in deterrence, incapacitation, or other beneficial effects can justify deliberately killing a captive human being as a means to even such desirable ends as deterring others from committing grave crime. The argument, then, is that justifying capital punishment on grounds of deterrence is a morally impermissible way to treat persons, even those found to have committed atrocious crimes. In discussions of capital punishment, it is deterrence that receives much of the attention for those exploring a utilitarian approach to the moral justification of the practice.
There are, however, other significant consequences of the death penalty that are relevant, as noted even by classic utilitarians. Such claims are, in principle, empirical ones about the causal effects of the practice of capital punishment. As with recent deterrence studies, there is no clear empirical evidence of any brutalizing or civilizing effects of capital punishment. For classic utilitarian thinking, another important consequence of punishment is its effect on the offender. This penal aim of reform or rehabilitation may suggest capital punishment is not justifiable for any crime. But that need not be the case. Plato also defends capital punishment by looking to its impact on the offender.
In his late work, The Laws, Plato explicitly prescribes capital punishment for a wide range of offenses, such as deliberate murder, wounding a family member with the intent to kill, theft from temples or public property, taking bribes, and waging private war, among others MacKenzie; Stalley. In a utilitarian approach to capital punishment, then, attending to the end of reforming offenders need not be irrelevant to possible moral justifications of the death penalty. A cluster of distinctive approaches to issues of justifying punishment and, at least by implication, the death penalty, are united by taking seriously the idea of punishment as expression or communication.
Hard treatment, deprivations, incarceration, or even death can be, and perhaps are, vehicles by which messages are communicated by the community. To see capital punishment as a deterrent is to see it as communicative: the death penalty communicates to the community—at least potential killers—that murder is a serious wrong and that execution awaits those who kill others. Various developments of punishment as communication, though, attend to other messages expressed, some emphasizing the sender and others the recipient of the message. One version of this kind of approach emphasizes that, with capital punishment, a community is expressing strong disapproval or condemnation of the misconduct.
The punishment for grave crimes should adequately reflect the revulsion felt by the great majority of citizens for them. It is a mistake to consider the object of punishment as being deterrent or reformative or preventive and nothing else. Georgia , as quoted in Gregg v. Georgia For example, the approach presupposes some moral merit to popular sentiments of indignation, outrage, anger, condemnation, even vengeance or vindictiveness in response to serious misconduct.
There are significant differences between expressing such emotions and punishing justly or morally see section 2b. Third, it leaves unanswered why the expression of communal outrage—even if morally warranted—is best or only accomplished through capital punishment. Why would not harsh confinement for life serve as well any desirable expressive, cathartic function? And does not the death penalty also express or communicate other, conflicting messages about, for example, the value of life? Other uses of the idea of punishment as communication focus not on the sender of the message, but on the good of the intended recipient, the offender.
Punishment is paternalistic in purpose: it aims to effect some beneficial change in the offender through effective communication. Some employing a similar reliance on punishment as communication are less ambivalent about its implications for the death penalty. Punishment as education is not a conditioning program; it addresses autonomous beings, and the moral good aimed at is persons freely choosing attachment to that which is good. Furthermore, it is argued, capital punishment conveys multiple messages, for example, about the value of a human life; and, it is argued, since one can never be certain in identifying the truly incorrigible, the death penalty is morally unjustified in all cases.
Approaches to capital punishment as paternalistic communication are challenged on several grounds. First, as a general theory of punishment, such expressive theories posit an extraordinarily optimistic view of offenders as open to the message that penal experiences aim to convey. Are there not some offenders who will not be open to moral education, to hearing the message expressed through their penal experiences? Are there not some offenders who are incorrigible? On these approaches to capital punishment, the reasons against executing serious offenders are essentially empirical ones about the communicative effects on the public of executions or the limits of diagnostic capabilities in identifying the truly incorrigible.
Second, with respect to capital punishment, perhaps for some offenders, the experience of trial, sentencing, and awaiting execution does successfully communicate and effect reform in the offender, with the death penalty then imposed to affirm that which effected the beneficial reform in the offender. Focusing on reforming or educating a recipient of a message suggests very individualistic and situational sentencing guidelines. Not only may this not be practical, such discretion in sentencing risks caprice or arbitrariness in punishing offenders by death or in other ways see section 5 ; and it challenges the fundamental, formal principle of justice, that is, that like case be treated alike. Finally, the implications of these approaches to punishment are quite at odds with the system of incarceration employed so universally for so many offenders.
The implications of punishment as communication aimed at the offender would require radical revisions of current penal practices, as some proponents readily admit. Much philosophic focus on punishment and the death penalty has been rooted in theoretical questions and principles. A result is that philosophers have mostly ignored more practical matters and moral facets of the institution of capital punishment. By the early s, a series of United States Supreme Court decisions established especially elaborate criminal procedures to be followed in capital cases: bifurcated trials one for conviction and one for establishing the sentence , a finding of at least one aggravator for a murder to be a capital crime, automatic appellate review of all sentences to death, guidelines for jury selections, etc.
After implementation of these Court-mandated procedures for death penalty cases, a number of empirical studies indicated continuing concerns and problems with the practice of capital punishment in America. For example, studies of capital cases conducted in some southern states showed that disproportionately large numbers of convicted murderers received death sentences if they were black, a disproportion even greater when the convicted murderer was black and the victim was white Bedau, The Death Penalty , Also, especially with the advent of new, scientific sources of evidence for example, DNA matching , studies suggest that numbers of persons innocent of any crime have been wrongly convicted, sentenced, and even executed for committing a capital crime Bedau, The Death Penalty , Morally justifying punishment in theory is distinguishable from whether it is justified in practice, given extant conditions.
For some, even though questions of theory and practice are distinguishable, they may not be unrelated. At each one of these points of decisions, it is argued, there is room for arbitrariness, mistakes, even discrimination. Furthermore, it is impossible and undesirable to remove all latitude, all discretion, in order to allow each of these decisions to be properly made in light of the particularities of the case, person, situation. I trust you are not questioning my integrity. I am neutral on attachment theory. I had assumed you would be quoting from something I could read and check the source for.
I have read extensively on attachment theory, it forms a key part of my ongoing education; CPD and post graduate qualifications. Please,then, in future remember to keep more up-to-date. Insecure attachment is not indicative of insensitive or bad parenting. Neither is a secure attachment indicative of good parenting. One or the other develops as a result of genetic and early environmental factors. The Bowlby attachment is around infants and how they are pre-programmed to form an affectional tie with any mother-figure which meets their needs.
Nothing to do with the the primary carer and nothing to do with danger. Please tell me do you make your own assessments of attachment on the strength of reports by contact workers and by reference to the Ainsworth assessment technique called the Strange Situation Classification SSC? If you do,be warned the technique is only really valid for babies. Preferably,you might also caution the Court that the your assessment is only professional opinion and speculation and that security of attachment does not necessarily mean bad parenting. I know you do your best.
My main worry is about how cp professionals misunderstand the theory and use it with a lack of impartiality not about the theory per se. But then again, it is down to the lawyers to argue the parents case in Court which is where the real systemic problems lie. Eviodence should be tested more rigourously,in my view. How is it possible to do so in a family court with such tight schedules? This is what I meant by not using the term attachment disorder. The attachment indicators SW are worried by are those based in fear et. If a child regularly experiences this kind of fear, because of abuse including emotional abuse or witnessing domestic violence, for example, the effect can be traumatising.
Be wary about taking to much notice of what children tell you though. Get the parents view too. Did you ever see the Harry Enfioeld show? For those with a longer memory in the s attachment theory was used in private law to justify mother custody ie the idea was that children are harmed by being separated from their mothers. Now attachment theory and the dubious neuroscience is being peddled to assess parenting with fleeting visits, no proper process and in a manner which is not scientifically valid. MPs and Judges all accept a theory which is not scientifically valid. We need a process like in USA and Canada to test these theories.
Personally, I cannot see that the process used by social workers etc has any validity, but Judges just follow it blindly. Woe betide anyone who challenges it, as it falls on deaf ears. I have heard plenty of explanations and discussions about attachment and how it is assessed. I understand it to mean that a child who has a good attachment is a child who is secure in the knowledge that the adults around him will look after him; they are consistent, reliable and safe.
I have met too many adults who as children did not feel safe or protected in their own homes; the consequences are often awful and life long. Sarah -Can I ask who wrote this post?. What are the effects of physical trauma during childbirth? Can this result in lifelong brain damage and if so does it differ from a neuro-developmental disorder as a result of a poor genetic inheritance or an in-vitro imbalance of hormones?
Are there phases in our development when they are very plastic for example in the first few years of life and again in adolescence? Where do we draw the line between disability and disorder and who has the skillset and competencies to make these calls for an individual child? I am not qualified to opine on the strength of much of the research into attachment. Each will interplay and affect the other.
After all, plenty of humans have made it to healthy adulthood without robotic, self-scrutinising parental care. Thanks Sarah for the clarifications. For these reasons I really think any work on genetic markers for resilience is in its infancy and probably akin to the medieval search for a method to create gold. I have two theories:- 1 Maltreatment causes physical disabilities, pseudo-Autism — nothing to do with Attachment Disorder at all for very many children in the Care system. So please can someone prove me wrong unless of course you think I should be able to produce evidence in which case theories become facts?
The emotional damage done can be huge. That leap is one of faith and if you choose to make it, then that is your belief — it is not a fact. I am describing a way of parenting. It represents an objective good, not some flakey theory. I have seen far too many adults who have suffered the lack of it as children. Or that I should believe that SWs should have enough skills to understand what constitutes harmful or neglectful parenting without this one theory? While in theory individual parents can choose to reject this parenting lifestyle, when governments decide that all parents require neuroparenting training to do a good enough job, we should be concerned. Having spent the past few years reading promotional material produced by neuroparenting advocates and surveying UK policy documents which have absorbed their key messages, I have wondered and worried about the consequences of this cold, technical reinterpretation of family life.
This is because under neuroparenting we are in an alien, joy-sapping territory — not a loving family home. Attachment theory is about the need for children to have a secure base, to know that there is a safe, reliable adult who will consistently meet their needs. I cannot understand how anyone could object to any standard of parenting that tried to ensure that a child felt loved and wanted.
Different children may need that expressed in different ways at different times. But as a fundamental bedrock of good parenting, it seems very obvious to me that it is what is needed. This is not to say that some children in Care are neuro-typical and have poor mental health but this is not the whole story. There are children of autistic parents in Care, and those children are likely to be autistic too. So I guess I mean there is a pretty comprehensive misunderstanding of the needs of a significant of children in Care — with this understanding, outcomes would be so much better for these particular children — imagine if 1 in 8 in Care.
In my world, the world of parents of high IQ Autism and poor mental health, — Attachment Disorder comes up again and again — parents have a tremendous battle to do whatever it takes to get that label removed from our children. It is the ultimate in parent blame — clinicians who hand it out without a real understanding of family dynamics gained in the family home over time and how realistic is that? Can I ask Sarah for example if you believe parents have a huge role in explaining the world to their children to prepare them for adulthood and to help them deal with much of the horrible news they are exposed to or that parents should role model how to deal with anxiety or anger?
Are they not just facets of parenting? I also am very dubious about much of the theory surrounding it linking cause and effect. Sadly I too have met many people with difficult problems in later childhood and adulthood. I would never link cause and effect in the way all are encouraged to via this theory. Is it a gift to policy makers as our health and social care systems crumble through lack of money and expertise to be replaced by people pushing products and services? I know this because I remember being a child. I see no problem at all in recognising this actual FACT and promoting parenting that is emotionally atuned to children.
Sarah neither do I but that is not Attachment Theory — that is responsible, capable, loving parenting. And is that the best arguement anyone can put forward in defense of this theory.. Trauma bonds? What are they? Sounds like more SW theory. Or that they are traumatised at separation from Mum which is highly likely? The Judge does not have time to read all the medical evidence in detail; he is entitled to expect the professionals to read them and make impartial assessments. However, if such speculation and guesswork is to be listened to then the powers of the Family Court should be limited.
This is worth reading too.. While there is evidence of positive outcomes and impact, the variation in the quality and quantity of available evidence suggests a need for further good quality evaluation to establish which services and configurations of services are most effective to meet the mental health and wellbeing needs of children and young people and their carers.
The detail case studies you have to register make interesting reading for all sorts of reasons. Only 2 covering 5 children of 88 from memory relate to autistic children. Sensory needs in children with attachment difficulties?? Thanks Helen — you must know my next question…. Please show why this is not nonsense for the starry eyed and the gullible….
Does this matter? Yes it does.. So , it works well for a child I know that they have a weighted blanket on their laps. It works well for another that they are greeted at the door by their teacher, and almost handed over by a parent, with a reassurance about when they will be handed back. The first child was not autistic, the second did not have attachment issues. Sensory needs in children with attachment difficulties — no wonder further good quality evaluation was recommended — In the case of these children, I can only suggest they are assessed for Autism as a matter of urgency. What a MESS.. Promoting the health and Wellbeing etc pg Secure Homes also achieve a range of health outcomes for children, including the diagnosing of their mental health issues.
Diagnosis is a signpost to a wealth of information about what works. Children have a right to diagnosis as much as they have a right to care from the adults in their lives. The risks these children face of exclusion, prison, homelessness, exploitation are so high. A child that needs a weighted blanked needs a very good assessment of her difficulties and from what you describe there is a high likelihood the child described is on the autistic spectrum. I was talking about the classroom accommodating everyone. If I was talking about there being no need for diagnosis I would have said so. This is what leaves me perplexed — Submission 62 is a Specialist therapeutic, long term fostering program Focus Fostering , providing solo placements for children aged 5 to 18 who have suffered complex developmental trauma.
Focus fostering is a multi-agency team with a dedicated CAMHS practitioner or lead, family placement social workers, support workers and a teacher. The service aims to provide a holistic approach that is psychologically informed, trauma sensitive and attachment focused. They have much in common with Cults…. Who will apologise to the countless families so failed by this system in decades to come? Is this what trauma sensitive feels like? There were improvements in for example, confidence for parents. The whole premise is so questionable.. Did parents have greater understanding of difficulties or were they just told they had?
Where is the evidence — Children showed an INCREASE in difficult behaviour — and this was submitted as a case study of good practice that we are supposed to want more of for our children?? It is difficult to know how to start unpicking the effect of these misconceptions and potential harm caused in individual cases where children have been removed from their families as a result.
It is in my view likely to have caused inter-generational harm on a very significant scale. It is also likely to have undermined trust in the structures of the State that once lost, may never be regained. Models of care and care pathways to support mental health and wellbeing of looked after children: Findings of call for evidence. Other pledges made, ahead of the upcoming election on 8 June, include more regulation for commercial fostering agencies. Attachment theory has some merit because it give an intellectual framework for understanding some of the components of good parenting that might otherwise be difficult to grasp intellectually.
It however has very serious limitations in that it does not address the difficulties of children who may not be meeting their developmental milestones for other reasons and can lead to an environment where all parents are encouraged to parent in a mechanistic way and when children do not respond to this, this is seen as a failure in parenting. Many of these children will have complex physical disabilities and poor mental health that remains unrecognised. This is happening largely without scrutiny or challenge.
Attachment theory is all about the need for children to have a safe, reliable adult who will be available to them, physically and emotionally, and consistently meet their needs. To simplify the argument would it be fair to say that children labelled with attachment problems react out of fear ,and unfortunately so do children with autism. Autism in many respects in a very heightened state of anxiety.
Their anxiety results in anxiety in family members. Hence the potential for wrong diagnosis of attachment problems. The overlap between autistic traits and the features of attachment issues means a specialist needs to diagnose. This is not about their Autism it is about not being recognised as needing adjustments. Sadly too many children enter Care at his point because it would take years to access a specialist assessment.
They lose the fragile links with their families and I have no idea what happens them post 18 — nothing in the public realm…I just know individual parents stories and the tremendous struggle they face — some do not even know where their child is — out of county, out of country. This is perfectly legal if the young person is over 16 and chooses not to share even though they may for example have the danger awareness of a three year old.. From a legal point of view one not understood by many family court lawyers attachment theory , attachment disorder etc.
Just speculation on which Family Courts which make very serious decisions such as adoption should never rely. Okay in less serious cases but in those where liquidation of natural families is to be considered guesswork,speculation, theory and professional opinion based on it is not acceptable. It is not proportionate. Such decisions to be taken on a matrix of facts alone. So why the hell do the Family Courts admit it as evidence in serious cases?
Of course, I have written this before. Is there anyone particular any parent who agrees or am I calling out in the dark? Yes, it is often misunderstood and misapplied. Sarah,I apologise for assailing the sendsitivities of Lawyers. Unfortunately,you are quit wrong that judgments made on so-called attachment theory is not speculation. It is and psychologists have reported it as such. Please see the above discussion. The Family Courts should stick to facts in serious cases. Just wondering if any one agrees that there should be higher standards for serious cases. Plus parents might be permitted to call witnesses.
Maybe no such tight time limits on hearings. Hearings of much less serious issues such as fraud or libel often take weeks if not months. What about proportionality and appeals. Why are appeals so often not allowed? To suit the lawyers or citizens. We want answers. Sarah has explained it quite clearly in her post above so we all know what it is from a legal angle. Research the views of parents and appeal court judgments for confirmation, readers..
It is a provable testable theory, based on the fact that children need a safe, reliable adult to meet their needs consistently and to be emotionally and physically available to them. Attachment disorder is very rare. Attachment theory is not on its own used to prove significant harm or the possibility of it. Attachment is a factor because that parents is unreliable and the child will feel anxious. An investigation into the prevalence of autism among children in care has prompted concerns that many are not being diagnosed and are missing out on important support as a result.
For me this, is THE scandal of the Care system — that Corporate parents are neglecting and there is no other word for this so many disabled children in their Care. I agree it is a national disgrace. Thanks to all the links and other information you have made available to professionals on this resource especially research into this subject not previously seen I am sure the lawyers, transparency campaigners and Guardians will realise that these special children are suffering degradation and mental torture. Well, I hope it will trickle down anyway and soon they will be advising children and parents to appeal cases owing to contravention of ECHR article 3. They will be rushing to the Supreme Court on behalf of the children and will be putting all the research evidence and demanding autistic expert input.
There will need to be a Court case about it because the CS are unlikely to re-consider things. Do any readers agree with me that the treatment meted out comprises degradation? All comments welcome. Please could you provide the name and date, for my Harvard Referencing, if i use information from this for my essay? If you want to cite information from here, simply use the reference as the Child Protection Resource Online — the date each post was published should be at the end. Pingback: Attachment — Who Makes the Diagnosis? Child Protection Resource. Pingback: attachment theory in early childhood education — rj-keller. Your email address will not be published.
Save my name, email, and website in this browser for the next time I comment. This site uses Akismet to reduce spam. Learn how your comment data is processed. Early attachment relations are thought to be crucial for later social relationships and for the development of capacities for emotional and stress regulation, self-control and metallisation… Where did attachment theory come from? John Bowlby The psychoanalyst John Bowlby — investigated how what happened to us as children could contribute to later problems as adults — in the way we behave and interact with other people.
Parent and infant alone. Stranger joins parent and infant. Parent leaves infant and stranger alone. Parent returns and stranger leaves. Parent leaves; infant left completely alone. Stranger returns. This allowed four different categories of behaviour to be investigated: Separation anxiety — what does the child do when the caregiver leaves? Willingness to explore — was the child confident to explore his environment?
Stranger anxiety — how did the child react to the stranger? Results of the experiment. See further this article from Simply Psychology She identified three main attachment styles Secure Insecure avoidant Insecure ambivalent. Infant shows signs of intense distress when mother leaves. Infant shows no sign of distress when mother leaves. Stranger Anxiety Avoidant of stranger when alone but friendly when mother present. Infant avoids the stranger — shows fear of stranger. Infant is okay with the stranger and plays normally when stranger is present. Children with this style grow up believing that they are unworthy of love. The style of attachment is passed down from generation to generation.
Children learn emotional bonding from their parents. Hence, it is crucial to pay attention to how you are comforting your children when they are in distress. Read More — Attachment style. Be as honest as possible when answering the questions since that will provide the most accurate results. Read every statement carefully and select whichever option applies to you. Assessment complete. Results are being recorded. You have reached 0 of 0 point s , 0. You tend to build relationships based on trust. You have high self-esteem and enjoy intimate relationships. You seek out social support and are comfortable to share feelings with other people. You are empathetic and able to set appropriate boundaries.
You are able to communicate your emotions without reservations. You are sensitive, warm and caring. You are also comfortable in long term intimate relationships. You understand your self worth and are not afraid to share your feelings, hopes or dreams with your partner. Would you like to learn more about your attachment style and how it affects your relationships? There are a number of factors that impact our attachment style. Our team of trained professionals and highly qualified psychologists, will help you develop a better understanding of your attachment style, and help you to improve yourself and your relationships.
Please contact our psychologists for a full and accurate diagnosis. It will aid you in doing all the things you love, while limiting activities that might dampen your mood. Contact Psychologist. Whether it involves emotional expression or developing a deep intimate bond, you tend to get uneasy when a relationship starts to develop. You are also not entirely comfortable relying on your partner when necessary.
You have strict boundaries and are usually emotionally distant. You dislike opening up to your partners or friends.I do Early Attachment Theory Essay disagree; most of all because i have found that to be Early Attachment Theory Essay, it is easy for me to agree. You dislike opening up Early Attachment Theory Essay your partners or Erwc Personal Narrative. Second, given that the right to life is Early Attachment Theory Essay fundamental to Early Attachment Theory Essay rights and, as many cross functional communication, held equally by Early Attachment Theory Essay and all because they are Allegory In George Orwells 1984, Early Attachment Theory Essay the right to life is exceptional or even unique in not being forfeitable at all: the right to Gout Persuasive Speech Early Attachment Theory Essay actually a fundamental natural or Early Attachment Theory Essay right. Discuss the usefulness of animal studies for investigating attachment.